T he health care reform debate has been effective in bringing visibility nor only to cost containment issues, but to the need for expanded access to health care. The reform strategies that are currently under consideration are incremental changes that build on the transition in health care that has been underway for more than a decade. A hallmark of that transition is managed care arrangements, such as capitation (which involves a set fee per patient) and other alternative reimbursement methods, which now have become pan of the norm (Miller & Luft, 1991) . These arrangements are part of a larger strategy, managed competition, the details of which are under debate for expanding access to care and containing costs.
Health economics literature is replete with examples showing that health care cannot be competitive in a strictly free market (Enthoven, 1988; Fuchs, 1988) . Strategies within the general framework of managed competition attempt [0 correct failures that occur in applying the free-market system to health care. Managed competition seeks to maintain health care delivery and financing within the private sector, albeit with some degree of government regulation. Advocates of managed competition do not seek to establish a governmental, single-payer system and are wary that government control would result in inefficiency, would be more costly than necessary, and would deter technological advances and improvements in the delivery of care (Enthoven, 1988) .
Beyond this broad concept, managed competition can incorporate many strategies, laws, and regulations that affect the free-market functioning in health care. This article will review the most common managed competition strategies that are either under debate or being tried and will discuss how they are applied to contain costs, expand access, and maintain health care within the private sector. Each of these strate-
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Managed competition was first e1Ls-cussed by Somers anel Somers (1972) ; in 1978, Enthoven began further formulating its concept. In 1994, thc Jackson Hole Group proposed details of the managed competition concept that are now being debated, revised, and negotiated bv Congress. (The Jackson Hole Group consists of nationally known health care policy analysts who selected themselves to meet informally at the home of a member in Jackson Hole. Wyoming. They discussed health policv issues, especially health polin' reform, and submitted their proposal to the Clinton Administration. Thev have no official appointment or organizational affiliation)
Many of the managed competition strategies involve the insurance industry because it is the primary means of access to health care and the main source of funding (Ruttenberg, 1993) . Contra,,)' to what is commonlv believed. the intent of managed competition is to preserve the private insurance industrY and the private sector management of the U.S. health care s\'stem (Hall. 1992) AnI' deviation from private insurance as the mainsta\' of the U.S. health care s\'stem would represent a massive overhaul of the system and could begin a definite move toward a government-based, single-payer system. Thus, managed competition is an effort to stave off a single-Dayer system. It is an alternative through which reforms of the health insurance industry can be accomplished and through which economic c10ul can be redistributed among the various segments of the private health care ind uStry.
Some of the strategies under managed competition are alreadv being tried; others are still under debate. The mosr common strategies that could affect access to care, and that are current· Iy debated by legislators, include employer mandates and community rating. Those strategies likely to affect cost containment include capitation and other managed care arrangements, as well as benefit DIan restructuring.
Expanding Access Through Employer Mandates and Community Rating
Although access to care is often presented as a financing dilemma, it is fundamentally an ethical problem that has yet to be resolved (Reiman & Reinhardt, 1986) . On the one hand, there is an intuitive sense among Americans that no one should be denied health care because of inabilitv to pay. Health is basic to one's abilitv to participate in the work force, to fulfill a social role in societv, and to secure necessalv goods and services. On the uther hand, health care has been treated as a commodity from which an entire industry continues to profit and grow The Lnitecl States has held to a strong belief that health care is a commodit\' that. as is true with all goods and services, should be paid through one's participation in the work force m in a traditional social role such as the spouse of a worker Managed competition straddles this ethical dilem-,Hal' /995. Volume 49, Number 5 mao It intervenes in the free-market system to expand access to care, but ir does so without entirely challenging the belief that access to health care should be based on one's ability to pal' for it.
The Medicaid and Medicare programs are a panial arrempt to resolve the problem by providing care to rhose too old to work or those who are both very poor and unemploved, while having rhe emplcl)'menr-based, private health insurance system provide the bulk of funding anci access to care (Rothman, 199. 3) However, the working but uninsured and the unemploved middle class can arrest that the problem has not been resolved. To date, the largesr segment of the uninsuI'ed al-e employed persons. particularly those who are working for small businesses. earning low wages, or working pan-time It is estimated that working A.mericans and rheir dependenrs consrirure abour 75% of rhe uninsured population (lJ.S.
General Accounting Office, 1991). One managed competition mechanism to expand access for rhe employeel but uninsured segment of the population is through emplover mandates
Mandates adjust the link between employment and access ro health il1sur-ance so that more people have coverage from emplovee-based health insul"ance. Emplover mandates, as thev are being defined in manv of the proposals, would require rhat all emplovers pal' about 8096 of each employee's health inSUI--ance premium costs for a basic benefits package (Stout, 1994) . Thev are aclvocared as not dil-eerly adding to government spending and allOWing business rhe tax advantage of clecluering emplovee healrh henefit costs. AnI' real cost to the em plover can be passed on to workers in lower wages, to consumers through higher prices, or to shareholders by way of smaller dividends.
The main oppOSition to emplovel' mandates comes from small businesses, which sal' that the drawbacks far outweigh anI' tax advantage. The\' claim that they cannot absorb the immediate costs of buving an\' form of health insurance. They \varn that, before the costs could be passed on and equilibrium established, small businesses could be fOITed to close or lVouleJ have to take other actions, such as requiring higher copayments from employees, eliminating retiree benefits, and replacing fullrime emplovees with part-time employ-
The American Journal CJj' Occupational Therapr ees (Battistella & Kuder, 199. 3)_ Incremental approaches toward employee mandates have also been proposed, such as providing small businl'sses with government subsidies for the cOS[S of pmviding health insurance, or legislating limited forms of mandates onlv for stares that do not meet targeted goals for expanding access (Stout, 1994)_ In whatever way they are specificall)' implemented, the crux of employer mandates, as an intervention in the free market, is that employers would continue to be the route through which health insurance premiums would be paid and collected and through which access to care would be expanded. Using employer mandares is not the onlv option for expanding access to cal'e, but it is the option that maintains the link between employment and health insurance. However, linking health insurance [0 employment raises an ethical question.
Under the current SYstem, employment derermines access to health care This situation means that the criteria (personal and social attributes and circumstances) that allow one (or qualify one) to be employeel are the same criteria that one must meet to have access to health care (jecker, 199.3). Employment is often awarded to a person for such attributes as intelligence, education, social position, or even wealth Those who believe that access to health care should be based on the need for health care would thus argue that linking employment to health care is unfair This ethical issue, however, is nOt addressed in the legislative arena, and everv effort in health reform, such as emplovee mandates, appears to be aimed at maintaining the employmentinsurance link.
Communitv rating of health insurance premiums is another strategy for expanding access to care. Community rating means that insurance companies charge the same rate for insurance premiums to all of their customers in a given geographic area, regardless of the health status of the population (Swartz, 1993) . Health insurance began with community rating, \vhere the risk and cost of illness was spread equallv across a communitv Since rhe 1970s, insurance companies have been using expel-ience rating to sell insurance at lower premiums to categories of people who were expected to have' a lower risk of illness. Using experience rating, insurance companies charge different rates to different customers (or groups of customers). Premium costs are adjusted on rhe basis of such individual variations as age, gender, previous claims experience, health status, and other such risks and predictors of health and illness. Thus, lower premiums based on experience rating were available to large employers, where working people are relatively healthy, where the risk can be spread over a greater number of people, and where the insurance company can collect greater profits from the greater number of premiums.
Insurers often point out that experience rating is fair because the healthy are not forced to subsidize the less healthy when each policy holder pays a premium that is consistent with his or her level of risk (Stone, 1993) . However, this concept of fairness must be viewed in comparison to another, the solidarity principle, which is a social insurance concept that certain agreed-upon individual needs will be paid for by a community or group (Stone, 1993) . Community rating, in the broadest sense, approximates the idea of the solidarity principle; experience rating is based on actuarial fairness.
Unfortunately, insurers exploited experience rating as a profit-generating mechanism (joseph and Edna Josephson Institute, 1994). Expel-ience rating became a competitive marketing strategy as insurers sought to gain a larger share of the market by offering the lowest-priced premiums to large employer groups (Stone, 1993) . This stratification resulted in enormous inequities for small businesses and individuals, thus contributing to the problem of diminished access to health care and leading to small businesses and individuals being priced out of the insurance marker. Additionally, experience rating led to absolutely denying health insurance or offering only exorbitantly expensive insurance to individuals who had preexisting conditions or were known to have other high-risk factors.
AJthough a move from experience rating back to community rating would promote greater access to health care, it could create other problems. Estimates are that community rating would increase the premium rates by 10% to 2096 for employers that heretofore had low premiums (Jones, Doe, & Topodas, 1993) . Those employers mighr rhen look for srraregies co decrease rheir cosrs, such as curring hack on covered benefirs or rerminaring healrh care benefits entirely. AddHlonally, ill5Urer:i might experience greater risk, which would ultima rely increase the cost of premiums. As an alternative w pure community raring, some managed competition schemes have suggested that pure community rating be tempered by alloWing insurance companies w use rating bands Oones et al" 1993). Rating bands limir the annual increase in I-ares and establish a prescribed ratio of the highest to lowest premium rate for similar groups. Another alternative to pure community rating is I'ating by class, in which insurers can varv premiums only by actuarial data on demographic variables, such as age or gendCl', but nor on claims experience, health Status, or length of rime since a policv was issued
The main straregies [0 expand access to care, employer mandates and community rating, are offered as separate srraregies in some proposab bUI are ried rogether in others, especiall\' when health care alliances or purchasing cooperatives al'e proposed. Health care alliances or purchasing pools are larger health insurance poo!.s of eirher small businesses or small businesses :Jnd individuals (U.S, General Accounting Office, 1994) Under some reform proposals, rhe alliances would control rhe premiums ami benefirs of insurance plans rhrough negotiation wirh insurance companies. The alliances or cooperarives would negotiate rhe community rates thar would be financed bv employer mandates.
Emplover mandates and communit\· rating could expand access for the working population, but discussion of eX[landed access fm IO\v-income, selfem [llo)'ed, or uncmployed persons has fallen bv the waYside in reform proposals. Ilowever. if the subjecl again comes ro rhe fore, access for rhese groups would most likelv be financed by government funding, funneled through such srruC(ures as the alliances or coopermives. This approach would provide access to the same health G11'e even rhough some persons \\ould have policies financed through emplovers and orhers would have policic.s financed rhrough rhe government. However, universal access currently receives lirrle suppon in legislarive debares.
The goal of increased access ro care cannor be separated frum cost (,(Intainmenr. Srr-ategies that would eX[land access al'e presented in the nexr sec-[ion, along with strategies for cost conrainmenr.
Cost Containment
The two major str'ategies used to contain cosrs arc (a) capitarion and other managed care arrangements and (b) benefirs plan restructuring. Capitarion and other managed care arrangemenrs affect the fees or reimbursement for services, whereas benefir plan restructuring defines whal diagnostic and trealment services will be covered bv healrh insurance. Bmh strategies address a basic distonion in applying free-marker principles ro health care.
If health care was priced according to a pure flTe-market svstem, rhe patient would make a conscious (rarional) decision [() purchase health care at a price agreeable ro borh patient and provider To make a rational decision, the patienr would have to undersrancl how the care would hdp him or her and would have to be aware of the prices that mher-[lhvsicians ()I' hospitals would charge for that same care (same qualitv, same degree of usefulness to the patient). With rhis information the patient would then decide wherher the care W,b useful enough to pal' the price being charged, whether some aspects of qualllv could be sacrificed in m'der ro pal' a lower price, or whether [() forego lhe care entil-elv, either because ir was not useful enough, given the price, ()I' because ir was unaffordable ar anv of the going prices. Clearlv, patienrs do not make such rarional decisions abour purchasing healrh care, Patients cannot acquir'e full information because ir can be too highlv technical to grasp quickly: the benefits or effectiveness of cal'e are somerimes unknown or can varv; rhe price of care, from one provicler ro anorher, is nor easily accessible; and rhe pain or urgenc\' of illness greatlv limits the patient's abilirv ro aClJuire information.
These limitations produce a disrortion in rhe marker thar allows provider-s to sel rheir fees inc!cpendentll-and ro affeci rhe demand for services. Com pens:Jting for rhis distortion, third-part\-pavers assumed the role of sponsors for palienrs in negoriaring prices of services and defining rhe level of healrh care Ilenefirs This anion creared a second conflict because m rhe same time that private third-part)' pavers negotiate with proVider.') on behalf of pariel1l.), rhe)' have an inrerest in their own profirabilitv, Insurance companies conrained costs by limiting I'eimbursement to what the insurer derermined as the usual and customary fcc, as well as through patient copavmenrs and deductibles (Institute of Medicine, 1989) Although the proVider received lesser reimbursement from the insurance company, he 01' she was srill free to charge whatever fee he or she determined was fair and could rhen bill the patient for the balance. The costs to tile insurance company were lowered and rhe provider still received the full reimbursement through balance billing, However, the overall costs of care were nor changed.
Under managed competilion, rhe price of care is negotiated wirh the providers of care by the managed care organi,-ation. There are manv schemes and variations on reimbursing professional services. In genel'al, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) negoriate sel fees wirh the prOVider, but the patient is usually not billed for the balance, The provider agrees to a capiration rare in which he or she is paid a ser amount per parient or is paid a set salarv to assume responsibiliry for the patients. In a slighrlv different managed care alTangemenr, such as preferred provicler organizations (PPOs), the provider agrees ro charge a discounted fee to patients covered bv the given insurance plan. The patient mal' be billed for the balance, bur on an alreadv discounted fee,
The major problem wirh rhese arrangemenrs, from rhe perspective of the proVider, is rhar he or she cannot inclependentl:' ser fees and may shal-e a level of financial risk wirh rhe managed care organization (I3erenson, 1991) However, a benefit to the proVider is that the managed care organization can usually guaranree rhe provider a certain level of income, This income is guaranteed as either a salary in some of rhe ca[litation plans or a guaranreed volume of parienr refen-als (Berenson) .
To gual'anree pmviders a certain volume of service and so give incentive for providers ro join rhe panel, some managed care organizations limil the number of providers on their panel. The I'amification is that some providers who ,\I'e willing to accept the negotiated reimbursement are not accepted on the panel (Berenson, 1991) . This situation essentially limits the abilit\' of some providers to compete for patients and it has raised antitrust actions against managed cal'e organizations. For example, providers in a small town, where a managed care organilation covers a large segment of the town's population, can be vinually dl'iven out of business (or out of town) if they cannot join the panel of providel's. The issue is still not I-esolved, bUl several states now have legislation with "any willing provider" clauses that require a managed care organization to accept any proVider willing to practice under the terms of the managed care organization's contracr with p1'Oviders.
Provicln., also encounter ~)['oblems when signing on with a number of different rnallaged care organizations. Each managed care (lI'ganiL;Hion mighl negotiate a different reimbursement rate with the provider; however, any of the organizations can specifv in the contract to receive the pmvider's lowest charge, which is termed a It/cored nalion status. Thus, if the pmvider agrees to a Imver nne with anothn managed care organization, the provider must then offel-the same low rate to the organi/.ation that put the favored nation clause in its contract. If the provicler receives ;] large number of patiell[s from the favored nation organilation, it can result in a substantial decrease in revenue for the prOVider. The evidence that milnaged care achieves cost savings i. ., COI1-flieting (Gabel & Rice, 1994; Miller & Luft, 1993; Petersen, 1994) . One source of the conflict is that many COSI studie., cannot be compared The)! differ in their definition of a rn;Jnaged C;Jrc arrangement <lI1d in defining the level uf benefits Additionally, there is little account of the out-of-pocket costs thar patients incur. funher, it is possible th,H cost savings are, in pan, a ,hift in pl'lJfits from the providel-to the rnanaged care organi<:ation.
The cost conrainmem su'megy that directll' affects the patient is benefit plan restructuring. Insurance cOl11p<tnies have played a major role in deciding what services and treatment v\oulLl he part of a package of henefits. Howev'er. an inherent conflict is th<tt insurance
The ;Imericall ./u/./rnll/ oj' OCCUjHlliullo/ lZ,l!rllpr companies have an interest in keeping the costS of care to a minimum in ordel' to m<L'(imize the company's profits (Gahel, Formisano, Lohr, & Oi Carlo, 1991) .
For some time, insurance companies have been defining benefit plans with an eye to reimhursing only those services that are medically necessary. For example, services that 31-e optional, such as cosmetic surgery and some prevemive services, are rarely included in a benefits package: benefits for mental health and substance abuse treatment have been limited, if offered at all; and u-eatment or diagnostic procedures thal al'e classified, by the insurer, as expel'imell[al are also not covered. With advances in technology and more diagnostic and treatment options available for a given condition, it has become increasingly difficult to define what constitutes medically necessal'y cal-e Making thirelparry pilyers even more cautious in de· signing benefit packages, health services research has documented that there are variations in medical care awund the country, suggesting that some care may be overused or that there may be inefficiencies in the health care c1elivel-y system (Wennbel-g & Gittelsohn, 1982) .
The problem \~ith excluding specific benefits is that some patients truly need them. Those that can pal' for them out of pocket can receive them, but those who cannot will nor be able to obtain them. Sometimes such a denial of benefits is tamamollnr to receiving nu care; at other times it results in a lesser quality of care for the patient. Benefits restructuring, in the extreme, merges with rationing of care and rationing always I'aises the question of whose needs shoulu shape rationing decisions Managed competition, to date. has not offered much of ,1 su!ution to the definition of benefits or cost contalllment problems. Ultimately, the profit mlHive, be il that of a managed care organization or that of an inSUl;JI1Ce COIllIXIJl\', can loum <IS a threm to the p;Hicnr's best Ill[crests (Relnlurdr. 19~6) However, insurCl's allli managed ell-e ol'ganizatlons h:lVe become mOl'e sensitive tu the negative press regarding their Interest in cutting bellefits or reimhursillg onl)' tl-eatl1)ent alternative." v\lth the 10\\ es( cost. Thev' hav'e IncreasinglY' marketed thcmselves bv t(lutlng their qu~tlirv improvement or qualitv' :Is"urance pmgrams as evidellCe that theY' look ;Jfter the qualirv' of care and the patient's interests. Through quality assurance and improvement programs, which now include outcomes research or medical effectiveness research, they a[[empt to justify their judgments ilbout the level of benefits.
Because benefits packages often exclude those services whose effectiveness is not thoroughly substantiated or those that have an effective but less expensive alternarive, the managed care organizations are in effect defining appropl'iate care for a given health condition Alarmingly, their ability to define appropriate care is questionable. Typically. managed care mganizations use repon cal'ds thilt proVide data such as patiem satisfacrion ,lnu the number of enrollees who received mammograms or other health screenings. Although one would agree that health screenings and patient satisfaction are an aspect of qualitv, they are an incomplete report on qualitv. Thu~ there is ongoing concel'll about how managed G\I-e will affect the qualitv of Gll-e and the professional judgment and autononlV of practitioners.
Health care providers have attempted to countCl' this pmblern lw developing guidelines for care, sometimes called pracrice parametec,. Although managed care organizations express an intel'est in the professional guidelines. it is too earl\' to sav-how or to what extell[ they will apply them.
It is notable that pmfessions, for all thell' ire about infringements on their auronomv, are still reluctant to describe appropriate cal'e; thel' fear that guielelines will be used to increase (heir eXjJo-.sure to malpl'actice liability and that insurel's will distort the content of the guidelines [0 further limit reimbursable benefits (lnstitutc of Medicine. 1992)
Because of this reluctance on the IJan of providers and also because of the inherent methodologiC;J1 problems in developing gUidelines, m,lnv' of the CUITellt gUidelines arc not ,"I)ecific enough ;]11(1 fail to comprehensivelv-document the literarure Thus, the mov'c to define appropriate care is pmceecling. hut is h;lmpel'ed lw the self-interests of both the pal'ers and the professions,
Conclusion
The private insurance industry. \\'hich is the J)l,linstav of financing the 1..;.5.
healrh care sv·s[em. i~ under attack and will be reformed, but is abo being preserved as a viable ortion 10 a singlerayer sYStem. In a sense, [he insurance industry is the target of reform in order 10 preserve it and its ability to manage health care within the rrivate seclOr.
Private senor management of the health care indUStry will allow the many segmenrs of the health care indusrry [() grow and profir. However, some segments will rrofit more than orhers and at the expense of orhers. Some segments, such as direCt providers, may experience a decline over their usual level of profits, whereas managed care organizations, for examrle, may reap a higher level of rrofits. With private sector interests in rrofits, it is difficult to imagine how the cOSts of care will actually be contained. 
